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We introduce Pixie, a novel, camera based two factor authentication solution for mobile and wearable devices. A quick and
familiar user action of snapping a photo is sufficient for Pixie to simultaneously perform a graphical password authentication
and a physical token based authentication, yet it does not require any expensive, uncommon hardware. Pixie establishes trust
based on both the knowledge and possession of an arbitrary physical object readily accessible to the user, called trinket. Users
choose their trinkets similar to seing a password, and authenticate by presenting the same trinket to the camera. e fact
that the object is the trinket, is secret to the user. Pixie extracts robust, novel features from trinket images, and leverages a
supervised learning classifier to effectively address inconsistencies between images of the same trinket captured in different
circumstances.
Pixie achieved a false accept rate below 0.09% in a brute force aack with 14.3 million authentication aempts, generated
with 40,000 trinket images that we captured and collected from public datasets. We identify master images, that match
multiple trinkets, and study techniques to reduce their impact.
In a user study with 42 participants over 8 days in 3 sessions we found that Pixie outperforms text based passwords on
memorability, speed, and user preference. Furthermore, Pixie was easily discoverable by new users and accurate under field
use. Users were able to remember their trinkets 2 and 7 days aer registering them, without any practice between the 3 test
dates.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Multi-factor authentication, Mobile and wearable device authentication
1 INTRODUCTION
Mobile and wearable devices are popular platforms for accessing sensitive online services such as e-mail, social
networks and banking. A secure and practical experience for user authentication in such devices is challenging,
as their small form factor, especially for wearables (e.g., smartwatches [63] smartglasses [80]), complicates the
input of the commonly used text based passwords, even when the memorability of passwords already poses a
significant burden for users trying to access a multitude of services [14]. While the small form factor of mobile
and wearable devices makes biometric authentication solutions seemingly ideal, their reliance on sensitive, hard
to change user information introduces important privacy and security issues [55, 56] of massive scale.
In this paperwe introduce Pixie, a camera based remote authentication solution formobile devices, see Figure 1
and [68] for a short demo. Pixie can establish trust to a remote service based on the user’s ability to present to the
camera a previously agreed secret physical token. We call this token, the trinket. Just like seing a password, the
user picks a readily accessible trinket of his preference, e.g., a clothing accessory, a book, or a desk toy, then uses
the device camera to snap trinket images (a.k.a., reference images). All the user needs to do to authenticate is to
point the camera to the trinket. If the captured candidate image matches the reference images, the authentication
succeeds.
Pixie combines graphical password [7, 19, 53] and token based authentication concepts [59, 79], into a two
factor authentication (2FA) solution based on what the user has (the trinket) and what the user knows - the
trinket, and the angle and section used to authenticate. Figure 2 shows examples of trinkets. Contrary to other
token based authentication methods, Pixie does not require expensive, uncommon hardware to act as the sec-
ond factor; that duty is assigned to the physical trinket, and the mobile device in Pixie is the primary device
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(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 1. Pixie: (a) Trinket setup. The user takes photos of the trinket placing it in the circle overlay. UI shows the number of
photos le to take. (b) Login: the user snaps a photo of the trinket. (c) Trinket setup messages provide actionable guidance,
when the image quality is low (top), or the reference images are inconsistent (boom).
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Fig. 2. Examples of good (a-c) and low quality (d-f) trinket images. Trinkets are small (parts of) objects carried or worn by users, thus
hard to steal and even reproduce by adversaries. ORB keypoints are shown as small, colored circles. Good images have a high number of
keypoints on the trinket. Low quality images are due to (d) insufficient light conditions on shirt section, (e) bright light and reflection, (f)
image blur, or uniform, texture-less trinket.
through which the user authenticates. Pixie only requires the authentication device to have a camera, making
authentication convenient even for wearable devices such as smartwatches and smartglasses.
Challenges and proposed approach. Building a secure and usable trinket based authentication solution is
difficult. Unlike biometrics based solutions, trinkets can be chosen from amore diverse space than e.g., faces, thus
lack the convenience of a set of well known features. In addition, users cannot be expected to accurately replicate
during login, the conditions (e.g. angle, distance and background) of the trinket setup process. us, Pixie needs
to be resilient to candidate images captured in different circumstances than the reference images. Pixie addresses
these problems in two ways: i) during the registration phase users are asked to capture multiple trinket images,
thereby revealing the variability of the trinket to Pixie, ii) to match a candidate image against these reference
images, Pixie leverages a statistical classifier using features which leverage robust keypoints [3, 60] extracted
from the trinket images.
In addition, in early pilot user studies, we identified new challenges for a successful deployment of Pixie.
First, that Pixie users may use low quality trinkets, e.g. with uniform textures, capture inconsistent reference
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images with largely different viewing angles, or capture low quality images of their trinkets, e.g., blurry, or
with improper lighting conditions, see Figure 2(d)-(f). In order to help the users pick high quality trinkets and
images thereof, we develop features that capture the quality of reference images as defined by the likelihood
of causing false accepts or false rejects during authentication. We use these features to train a trinket image
rejection classifier that detects low quality images before they can be used as Pixie trinkets.
Second, we found that it is crucial to give the user actionable feedback about how to choose a beer trinket
when the Pixie filter rejects trinket images. For instance, a set of reference images can be rejected because they
contain different trinkets, or because one of the images is blurry. However, most statistical classifiers are not
easily interpretable, thus cannot indicate the nature of the problem. In order to provide meaningful actionable
feedback, we identify feature threshold values that pinpoint problem images and naturally translate them into
user instructions (see Table 4).
Implementation and evaluation. We implement Pixie for Android, and show using an extensive evaluation
that Pixie is secure, fast, and usable. Pixie achieves a False Accept Rate (FAR) of 0.02% and a False Reject Rate
(FRR) of 4.25%, when evaluated over 122, 500 authentication instances. Pixie processes a login aempt in 0.5s
on a HTC One (2013 Model, 1.7GHz CPU, 2GB RAM).
To evaluate the security of Pixie, we introduce several image based aacks, including an image based dic-
tionary (or “pictionary”) aack. Pixie achieves a FAR below 0.09% on such an aack consisting of 14.3 million
authentication aempts constructed using public trinket image datasets and images that we collected online.
Similar to face based authentication, Pixie is vulnerable to aacks where the adversary captures a picture of the
trinket. However, we show that Pixie is resilient to a shoulder surfing aack flavor where the adversary knows
or guesses the victim’s trinket object type. Specifically, on a targeted aack dataset of 7, 853 images, the average
number of “trials until success” exceeds 5, 500 irrespective of whether the adversary knows the trinket type or
not. In addition, we introduce and study the concept of master images, whose diverse keypoints enable them to
match multiple trinkets. We develop features that enable Pixie to reduce the effectiveness of master images.
We perform a user study with 42 participants over 8 days in 3 sessions, and show that Pixie is discoverable:
without prior training and given no external help, 86% and 78% of the participants were able to correctly set
a trinket then authenticate with it, respectively. Pixie’s trinkets were perceived as more memorable than text
passwords, and were also easily remembered 2 and 7 days aer being set.
Further, without any additional practice outside of the 3 sessions, participants entered their trinket progres-
sively faster than their text passwords. Participants believed that Pixie is easier to use, more memorable and
faster than text passwords. We found that the preference of Pixie over text passwords correlates positively with
its preference on ease of use, memorability and security dimensions and overall perception of trinket memora-
bility and willingness to adopt Pixie. In addition, 50% of participants reported that they preferred Pixie over text
passwords.
In summary, we introduce the following contributions:
• Pixie. We introduce Pixie, a two factor, mobile device based authentication solution, that leverages the
ubiquitous cameras of mobile devices to snap images of trinkets carried by the users. Pixie makes mobile
device based authentication fast and convenient, and does not require expensive, uncommon hardware.
Pixie leverages a novel set of features that determine if a candidate image contains the same token as
a set of reference images [§ 4.3]. We develop filters that identify low quality images and inconsistent
reference images, and provide actionable feedback to the users [§ 4.4].
• Security. We develop several image based aacks including brute force image dictionary aacks, a
shoulder surfing flavor and master image aacks. We construct more than 14.3 million authentication
instances to show that Pixie is resilient to these aacks [§ 5.3].
• User study. We implement Pixie in Android, and show through a user study with 42 participants that it
is accurate, faster than text passwords, perceived as such by users, and its trinkets are memorable [§ 5].
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Success rate Entry Time Number of trials
Solution (%) (s) before success
Pixie 84.00 7.99 (Std=2.26, Mdn=8.51) 1.2 (Std=0.4, Mdn=1)
Text password (MyFIU) 88.10 12.5 (Std=6.5, Mdn=11.5) 1.4 (Std=1.02, Mdn=1)
Text password (comp8) [70]* 75.0-80.1 (Mdn=13.2) 1.3
Eye tracking [44] 77.2-91.6 ¡ 9.6 1.37 (Std=0.8, Mdn=1)-1.05 (Std=0.3, Mdn=1)
GazeTouchPass [40] 65 3.13 1.9 (Std=1.4, Mdn=1)
Face biometric [76] 96.9 (Mdn=5.55) N/A
Face & eyes [8]* N/A 20-40 1.1
Face & voice [76] 78.7 (Mdn=7.63) N/A
Voice biometric [76] 99.5 (Mdn=5.15) N/A
Gesture (stroke) biometric [76] 100 (Mdn=8.10) N/A
Android paern unlock [34] 87.92 0.9 (Std=0.63, Mdn=0.74) 1.13(Std=0.06, Mdn=1.11)
Passpoints [14]* 57 18.1 (Mdn=15.7) 2.2
Xside [22] 88 3.1-4.1 N/A
* The study device is a computer.
Table 1. Comparison of usability related metrics of Pixie’s camera based two-factor authentication approach with text, bio-
metric and graphical password authentication solutions. ePixie user entry time is faster than typing text passwords.
The results of text-based passwords evaluated in § 6.2 are consistent with those from previous work. Pixie’s median of login
trials until success is 1, similar to other solutions.
• Reproducibility. Pixie is an open source prototype, with code and the Android installation file available
on GitHub [12] and the Google Play Store [? ]. We have alsomade our datasets, including the Pixie aack
datasets, available for download [11].
2 RELATED WORK
Pixie is a camera based authentication solution that combines graphical password and token based authentication
concepts, into a single step 2 Factor Authentication (2FA) solution. Pixie authentication is based on what the user
has (the trinket) and what the user knows (the particular trinket among all the other objects that the user readily
has access to, angle and viewpoint used to register the trinket). e unique form factor of Pixie differentiates it
from existing solutions based on typed, drawn, or spoken secrets. We briefly survey and distinguish Pixie from
existing solutions.
2.1 Mobile Biometrics
Biometric based mobile authentication solutions leverage unique human characteristics, e.g., faces [21], finger-
prints [2], gait [38], to authenticate users. In particular, the Pixie form factor makes it similar to camera based
biometric authentication solutions based on face [8, 21, 76] and gaze [40, 44]. Consequently, Pixie shares several
limitations with these solutions, that include (i) vulnerability to shoulder surfing aacks and (i) susceptibility
to inappropriate lighting conditions, that can spoil the performance and usability of the authentication mecha-
nism [4, 45].
In contrast to biometrics, Pixie enables users to change the authenticating physical factor, as they change
accessories they wear or carry. is reduces the risks from an adversary who has acquired the authentication
secret from having lifelong consequences for the victims, thereby mitigating the need for biometric traceability
and revocation [56].
Camera Based Two Factor Authentication Through Mobile and Wearable Devices • 1
Table 1 compares the user entry times of Pixie with various other authentication solutions. While Pixie takes
longer than biometric authentication based on face [76], it is still faster than several authentication solutions
based on gaze [8, 44]. We note that while fingerprint based authentication is fast and convenient [4], it is only
applicable to devices that invest in such equipment. In contrast, cameras are ubiquitously present, including on
wearable devices such as smartwatches and smartglasses.
Pixie needs to solve a harder problem than existing biometrics based authentication solutions, due to the di-
versity of its trinkets: while existing biometrics solutions focus on a single, well studied human characteristic,
Pixie’s trinkets can be arbitrary objects. We note that Pixie can be used in conjunction with biometric authen-
tication solutions, e.g., [20]: in touchscreen devices, one could use a touch gesture to mark the trinket, as an
additional authentication factor.
2.2 Security Tokens and 2 Factor Authentication (2FA)
e trinket concept is similar to hardware security tokens [59], as authentication involves access to a physical
object. Hardware tokens are electronic devices that provide periodically changing one time passwords (OTP),
which the user needs to manually enter to the authentication device. Mare et al. [46] found that 25% of authen-
tications performed in the daily life employed physical tokens (e.g. car keys, ID badges, etc.).
Common soware token solutions such as Google’s 2-step verification [33], send a verification code to the
mobile device, e.g. through SMS or e-mail. e user needs to retrieve the verification code (second authentication
factor) and type it into the authentication device. is further requires the device to be reachable from the
server hence introduces new challenges, e.g. location tracing, delays in phone network, poor network coverage.
Moreover, such solutions provide no protection when the device is stolen. ey also impact usability, as the user
needs to type both a password and the verification code. In contrast, the Pixie trinket combines the user’s secret
and the second authentication factor. It also reduces user interaction, by replacing the typing of two strings with
snapping a photo of the trinket.
Solutions such as [17, 39, 71] treat the mobile device as a second factor and eliminate user interaction to
retrieve a token from the mobile device to the authentication device (e.g. a desktop) by leveraging proximity
based connectivity (e.g., Bluetooth, Wi-Fi). In contrast, Pixie assigns the duty of storing the token for the second
factor to a physical object outside the mobile device. e mobile device is the sole device that is used to access
the services on remote servers. As an added benefit, the physical factor of the trinket renders Pixie immune to
the “2FA synchronization vulnerabilities” introduced by Konoth et al. [42], that exploit the ongoing integration
of apps among multiple platforms. Since Pixie authentication requires a simple interaction with the user, it is
also possible to combine Pixie with a token stored on the mobile device. e combined Pixie and mobile device
token authentication would require the user to possess both the particular mobile device that stores the token
and the trinket.
Pixie also differs from 2FA methods that involve visual tokens, e.g, QR-codes [25, 71], as the trinket is secret
to the user, the aacker needs to discover the trinket and also take possession of it. We note that a Pixie variant
could be used in conjunction with the security token concept: the token displays a paern (e.g., a QR code,
random art), which the user captures using Pixie.
2.3 Wearable Device Authentication
To address the limited input space of wearable devices, available sensors (e.g. camera) are commonly exploited
to provide alternative input techniques: Omata and Imai [52] identify the input gesture of the user by sensing
the deformation of the skin under the smartwatch. Withana et al. [86] use infrared sensors to capture the gesture
input of the user to interact with a wearable device. Yoon et al. [87] exploit the ambient light sensor to capture
the changes in light state as a form of PIN entry for wearable devices.
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Similar to Pixie, cameras integrated in wearable devices have been used to capture the input for authentication.
Van Vlaenderen et al. [78] exploit the smartwatch camera to provide the device with an input (e.g. PIN) that is
drawn on a canvas, then use image processing techniques to interpret the captured input. Chan et al. [13]
propose to pair and unlock smartglasses with the user smartphone by exploiting the glass camera to scan a QR
code that is displayed on the user’s phone screen. Similarly, Khan et al. [41] use the smartglass camera to scan a
QR code that is displayed on a point-of-service terminals (e.g. ATM) to connect to a cloud server for obtaining
an OTP.
Wearable devices can be used as the second authentication factor, see [5] for a survey. Corner and Noble [16]
use a wearable authentication token, which can communicate to a laptop over short-range wireless, to provide
continuous authentication to the laptop. Lee and Lee [43] use the smartwatch to collect and send the motion
paerns of the user for continuous authentication to a smartphone.
As Pixie does not require uncommon sensors or hardware, but only a camera, it is suitable for several camera
equipped wearables [63, 73, 80].
2.4 Graphical Passwords
Pixie’s visual nature is similar to graphical passwords, that include recall, recognition and cued recall systems
(see [7] for a survey). Recall based solutions such as DAS (Draw-A-Secret) [37] and variants [26, 30] ask the user
to enter their password using a stylus, mouse or finger. For instance, De Luca et al. [22] proposed to enter the
stroke based password on the front or back of a double sided touch screen device. In recognition-based systems
(e.g., Passfaces [24, 53]), users create a password by selecting and memorizing a set of images (e.g., faces), which
they need to recognize from among other images during the authentication process.
Pixie can be viewed as a recognition based graphical password system where the possible secret images are
dynamically generated based on the physical world around the user. Since the user freely presents the candidate
password through a photo of the physical world, captured in different light, background, and angle conditions,
Pixie has to implement an accurate matching of trinkets. Trinkets can be small portions of items worn by users
(e.g., shirt paern, shoe section). Pixie accurately verifies that the candidate image contains the same trinket part
as a set of previously captured reference images. is process endows Pixie with aack resilience properties: to
fraudulently authenticate, an adversary needs to capture both the mobile device and the trinket, then guess the
correct part of the trinket.
2.5 Text-Based Passwords
e usability of traditional text-based passwords has been well studied in literature, see e.g., [14, 48, 70, 76].
Trewin et al. [76] found that face biometrics can be entered faster than text based passwords and Table 1 shows
that Pixie is also faster than text based passwords. Several limitations are associated with text passwords onmem-
orability and usability especially when adopted in mobile platforms. For instance, Shay et al. [70] have shown
through a large user study of different password-composition policies, that more than 20% of participants had
problems recalling their password and 35% of the users reported that remembering a password is difficult. eir
reported user entry time for text passwords ranges between 11.6-16.2s (see Table 1) in line with our evaluation
(see § 6.2.4). Pixie is also perceived as more memorable than text passwords (see 6.2.5).
Melicher et al. [48] found that creating and entering passwords on mobile devices take longer than desktops
and laptops. In mobile devices, text-based passwords need to be entered on spatially limited keyboards on which
typing a single character may require multiple touches [64], due also to typing the wrong key. Pixie replaces
typing a password with pointing the camera to the trinket and snapping a photo of it.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 3. (a) System model: the user authenticates through a camera equipped device (smartphone, smartwatch, Google
Glass, car), to a remote service, e.g., e-mail, bank, social network account. The remote service stores the user credentials and
performs the authentication. (b) Pixie registration and login workflows: to register, the user captures “reference images”
of the trinket, which are filtered for quality and consistency. To authenticate, the user needs to capture a “candidate image”
of the trinket that matches the reference images.
3 SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODEL
3.1 System Model
Figure 3(a) illustrates the system model. e user has a camera equipped device, called the authentication device.
Authentication devices include smartphones, tablets, resource constrained devices such as smartwatches and
smartglasses, and complex cyber-physical systems such as cars. e user uses the authentication device to
access remote services such as e-mail, bank and social network accounts, or cyber-physical systems, e.g., home
or child monitoring systems (see § 3.2 for a discussion on other related scenarios).
We assume that the user can select and easily access a physical object, the trinket. e user sets the authenti-
cation secret to consist of multiple photos of the trinket, taken with the device camera. We call these “reference”
images, or reference set. To authenticate, the user snaps a “candidate” image of the trinket. is image needs
to match the stored, reference set. Figure 3(a) illustrates an approach where the remote service stores the user’s
reference set and performs the image match operation. In § 7 we compare the merits and drawbacks of this
approach to one where the authentication device performs these tasks.
Pixie can be used both as a standalone authentication solution and as a secondary authentication solution,
e.g., complementing text based passwords.
3.2 Applications
While this paper centers on a remote service authentication through a mobile device scenario, Pixie has multiple
other applications. First, authentication in camera equipped cyber-physical systems. For instance, cars can use
Pixie to authenticate their drivers locally and to remote services [67]. Pixie can also authenticate users to remote,
smart house or child monitoring systems, through their wearable devices. Further, doorlocks, PIN pads [65, 67]
and fingerprint readers can be replaced with a camera through which users snap a photo of their trinket to
authenticate.
Pixie can be used as an alternative to face based authentication when the users are reluctant to provide their
biometric information (e.g. in home game systems where the user needs to authenticate to pick a profile before
playing or to unlock certain functionalities). Pixie can also be used as an automatic access control checkpoint
(e.g. for accessing privileged parts of a building). e users can print a visual token and use it to pass Pixie access
control checkpoints.
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Requirement Pixie Feature
Increase the size of trinket &
Reduce the background area in trinket images
1. Disable camera zoom
2. Overlay a circle as the target area on the camera view
Ensure the quality of reference and candidate images
Ensure consistency of reference images
1. Design prefilters for checking the quality of images
2. Translate the prefilter criteria into actionable feedback to the users
Improve the discoverability of Pixie
1. Show number of remaining images to take in registration screen
2. Show camera capture icon for login page
3. Add step by step in-app instruction on how to use Pixie
Table 2. Summary of user interface improvements identified during pilot studies.
In addition, given the large number of people whowork from home [69], Pixie can provide an inexpensive 2FA
alternative for organizations to authenticate employees who are connecting to the private network remotely [32]:
replace the hardware tokens with user chosen Pixie trinkets.
3.3 Adversary Model
We assume that the adversary can physically capture the mobile device of the victim. We also assume that
the adversary can use image datasets that he captures and collects (see § 5.1) to launch brute force pictionary
attacks against Pixie (see § 5.3.1).
Similar to PIN based authentication to an ATM, Pixie users need to make sure that onlookers are far away
and cannot see the trinket and its angle. However, we consider a shoulder surfing aack flavor where the
adversary sees or guesses the user’s trinket object type. e adversary can then use datasets of images of similar
objects to aack Pixie (see § 5.3.2).
Further, we also consider an adversary that aempts to launch amaster image attack, i.e., identify images
that contain diverse features and match many trinkets. Example master images include “cluer” images, with
an array of shapes, colors and shadows (see § 5.3.3).
4 PIXIE
4.1 Pixie Requirements
In addition to being resilient against aacks (see § 3.3), Pixie needs to satisfy the following requirements:
• Trinket image quality. Pixie needs to ensure the quality of trinkets and images. Early pilot studies
showed that not all the trinkets that the users chose, or the photos that they took, were suitable for
authentication.
• Trinket match. Pixie needs to match images of the same trinket, even when captured with a different
background, lighting, or from a slightly different distance or angle.
• Discoverability. New users should easily discover the functionality of Pixie.
• Deployability. Pixie should be easy to integrate into existing systems.
Figure 3(b) depicts the modular approach we use for Pixie to address these goals. e image capture module
seeks to address part of the first requirement, by facilitating the capture of quality trinket images. e authenti-
cation module tackles the second requirement through the use of trained classifiers to match trinket images. To
simultaneously address the first and third requirements, i.e., to ensure the discoverability of Pixie while guiding
new users through the capture of high quality photos and the choice of visually complex objects as the secret, the
filter module detects and eliminates low quality images and invalid reference sets. We now detail each module.
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Fig. 4. Example ORB keypoint matches between two images of the same trinket, taken in different conditions. Each line
represents a match: it connects matching keypoints (shown as small colored circles) from each image.
4.2 Image Capture & Feedback
We performed pilot studies to identify early problems with the Pixie user interface. Table 2 summarizes the
design improvements we made to the Pixie UI. For instance, during the pilot studies, some users captured trinket
photos whose background provided more features than the trinkets. is revealed that the trinket needs to be the
main object in captured images. To simultaneously satisfy this requirement, and the trinket quality requirement
above, we design Pixie to guide the user to take larger photos of trinkets. We achieve this by overlaying a circle
on the camera image: the user needs to fit the trinket impression inside the circle (see Figures 1(a) and 1(b)).
Since Pixie does not allow zooming in, the user needs to bring the camera closer to the trinket, hence take a
larger photo. Pixie crops the image, and retains only the largest rectangle parallel to the sides of the device that
fits the circle.
In addition, we observed that the quality of trinket images captured by the users could be low (e.g. blurry or
dark), or the users may take inconsistent trinket images in the registration phase. To ensure the quality of trinket
images and the consistency of reference images, we identified common problems that occur during the image
capture process (e.g., insufficient light, trinket with plain texture). en, we mapped prefilter rejection decisions
provided by Pixie’s image filter (see § 4.4) into informative error messages (see Figure 1(c)). Furthermore, to
facilitate the discoverability of Pixie, we designed and included a step by step in-app instruction guide on how
to use Pixie.
4.3 The Authentication Module
e authentication module is responsible for addressing Pixie’s second requirement (see § 4.1), of matching the
candidate image against the reference images. Pixie extracts robust keypoints from these images, identifies a
suite of features from the keypoint match process, then uses them to train a classifier that decides if the candidate
image matches the reference set. We now detail this process. Let C denote the candidate image, R be the set of
reference images, and R be any of the reference images (see § 3.1).
Keypoint matching. We use SURF (Speeded Up Robust Features) [3] and ORB [60] algorithms, to extract scale
and rotation invariant image keypoints from the candidate and reference images, e.g., shown as small colored
circles on images in Figure 4 and 2. We also extract the descriptors of the keypoints, which represent their
characteristics. To determine if a candidate image C and a reference image R contain the same trinket, we
compute a 1-to-1 matching between their keypoint descriptors (e.g., shown as lines in Figure 4). We use brute-
force matching for ORB keypoints, where each keypoint of the candidate image is matched with the closest
keypoint (in terms of Hamming distance) of the reference image. For SURF keypoints, we use the FLANN-based
matcher [50].
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Solution Features Details
Keypoint stats. Statistics of ORB/SURF keypoints
Pixie Keypoint nearest neighbors Keypoint match stats.
Perspective transformation RANSAC optimal map of match keypoints
Keypoints Count and spread of keypoints
Pixie filters Edge pixels Count and spread of edge pixels
Reference quality Reference image similarities stats.
Table 3. Summary of (top) Pixie features and (boom) Pixie filter features.
An exhaustive matching of each keypoint in the candidate image to a keypoint in the reference image will
produce low quality, outlier matches. We experimented with several existing filters, including threshold, cross
checking and RANSAC [29], to identify and remove outlier matches. e RANSAC based filter performed the
best, hence we use it implicitly in the following.
Image similarities. Given two images C and R, we define their similarity Sim(C,R) to be the ratio between
the number of keypoint matches of C and R, aer the above filter and outlier detection steps, and the number
of keypoints in C . Given C and the set R, we define the nearest neighbor similarity of C to R as NNSim(C,R) =
max {Sim(C,R)|∀R ∈ R}, and the farthest neighbor similarity, FNSim(C,R) = min {Sim(C,R)|∀R ∈ R}.
Given a reference set R, we define the average nearest neighbor similarity value of each reference image, to
the other reference images in R: AvдRe f NN (R) =
Σ
R∈R
NNSim(R,R−R)
|R |
. Similarly, we define the average farthest
neighbor similarity value of each reference image to the other images in R: AvдRe f FN (R) =
Σ
R∈R
F NSim(R,R−R)
|R |
.
Template image. Given a reference set R, we define its template image, T (R), as the reference image R whose
value
∑
r ∈R−R Sim(r ,R) is the maximum among all reference images in R. Intuitively,T (R) is the reference image
“closest to the center” of the reference set. We define AvдRe f Templ(R) as the average similarity of images in R
to T (R).
Pixiematching features. We use the above concepts to extract the following features (see Table 3, top section).
We use these features to train a supervised learning algorithm.
• Keypoint counts. e keypoint count ofC andT (R).
• Match based features. e number of keypoints in C and T (R) that match, before the RANSAC filter. e min,
max, mean and SD of the distance, size, response and angles between the matched keypoints inC andT (R), aer
RANSAC.
• ality of the reference set. AvдRe f NN (R), AvдRe f FN (R) and AvдRe f Templ(R).
• Similarity to template. e similarity of C to T (R), normalized by the average similarity of the images in R to
T (R), i.e.,
Sim(C,Templ (R))
AvдRef T empl (R)
.
• Similarity to reference set. We defineminSim(C,R) = min {Sim(C,R) |∀R∈R }
AvдRef F N (R)
: the ratio of the similarity between C
and “farthest” reference image, and the average least similarity between reference images. Similarly,
maxSim(C,R) =
max {Sim(C,R) |∀R∈R }
AvдRef N N (R)
.
• Homography: Output of homography betweenC andT (R): the perspective transformation between the planes
of the two images (3 features).
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Fig. 5. Example 2D histograms of KP-CNT of template image vs. AvдCrossSim(R). (a) Correctly classified instances. (b) False reject
instances. (c) False accept instances. The legend in (a)-(c) shows the color code used for the number of authentication instances. (d)
Aggregated 2D histogram. The darker regions with 1 in the center have a greater proportion of misclassified than correctly classified
instances. The regions with -1 in the center correspond to value ranges on which we have no template images. Conclusion: Filter out
reference sets with KP-CNT < 20 and AvдCrossSim(R) < 0.6.
4.4 Pixie Filters
Early pilot studies revealed that Pixie users can capture low quality images. Such images, either reference or
candidate, hinder the ability of the authentication module to discern candidate images, increasing the FRR of
Pixie. Furthermore, they impose gratuitous network latency in the remote authentication scenario (see § 3.1).
Several conditions may prevent taking high quality images Figure 2(d)-(f) shows example outcomes of such
conditions, including (i) improper lighting, (ii) unsteady hand and (iii) choice of trinkets with constant texture.
We also observed that some pilot study participants, during the reference set registration process, took photos
containing different trinkets, or different areas of the same trinket. To address these issues, we introduce a set of
filters (see Figure 3(b)) that reject problematic images captured by the user. We propose the two rules of filtering,
that set out the operation space for Pixie image filters:
• Filter Rule #1: Pixie may not willfully fail by operating on images on which it predicts it will fail.
• Filter Rule #2: Pixie may not operate in a space where it has not been trained.
In the following, we detail these rules and describe the resulting filters.
4.4.1 Filter Rule #1: CBFilter and RBFilter. We introduce CBFilter and RBFilter, filters that identify reference
and candidate images on which they predict Pixie will fail. e filters leverage the following features, (see
Table 3(boom section) for a summary).
Filter features. First, we define KP-CNT as the keypoint count of an image. e intuition for using this feature
is that an image with a low KP-CNT (e.g., Figure 2(f) with only 5 keypoints) is likely to negatively impact the
accuracy of Pixie’s matching process. A second feature is based on the center, or centroid of the keypoints
extracted from an image: Let DTC-KP (distance to center of keypoints) denote the average distance between
the keypoints of the image and their centroid. DTC-KP measures the spread of the keypoints across the image.
e intuition is that a high DTC-KP may indicate that some keypoints do not belong to the trinket but to the
background. ird, to detect blurry images, we use the Canny edge detector [9] to identify edge pixels that
delimit objects in the image. Let White-CNT denote the number of detected edge (“white”) pixels of an image.
White-CNT is an indicator of the clarity of the image: a low White-CNT denotes a blurred image, with few
trinket edges. We also introduce DTC-White (distance to center of white pixels), the average distance of the
white pixels to their centroid. DTC-White denotes the spread of the edge pixels, i.e., the size of the trinket. Finally,
to detect inconsistent reference images, we define MinCrossSim(R), MaxCrossSim(R) and AvдCrossSim(R), to
be the minimum, maximum and average similarity (see § 4.3) among all the pairs of images in R. Small cross
similarity values indicate reference images of non-identical trinkets.
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Image type Filter Rule Interpretation
Reference KP-CNT < 20 Low quality image or plain trinket
Reference DTC-KP < 30 Low quality image or plain trinket
Reference AvgCrossSim < 0.6 Non-identical trinkets in reference set
Candidate KP-CNT < 20 Low quality image or plain trinket
Candidate DTC-KP > 44, 600 Out of bounds image
Candidate White-CNT > 22, 400 Out of bounds image
Candidate DTC-White > 160 Out of bounds image
Table 4. RBFilter and UBounds filter rules for reference and candidate images, and their real world interpretation. RBFilter
(top 2 sections) filters images on which it predicts Pixie will fail. UBounds (boom section) filters images outside the space
seen by Pixie during training.
CBFilter: Classifier Based Filter. Given the reference set R and its template image T (R) (see § 4.3), CBFilter
uses a suite of features to train a supervised learning algorithm and determine if R is suitable to participate
in the authentication process. e features include KP-CNT, DTC-KP, White-CNT, DTC-White of T (R), the
average, minimum and maximum of KP-CNT, DTC-KP, White-CNT, DTC-White over all the images in R, and
MinCrossSim(R),MaxCrossSim(R) and AvдCrossSim(R).
RBFilter: Rule Based Filter. Pilot studies demonstrated the need to give relevant feedback to users as early
as possible: early pilot study participants expressed frustration when they discovered that the photos they took
were not suitable at the end of the registration, or worse, during the authentication process. e output of
CBFilter cannot however be used to provide meaningful feedback.
To address this limitation, we identified common problems that occur during the image capture process, e.g.,
improper light, trinket with plain texture or not identical reference images. We then developed a set of rules
for these filter features, that (i) predict if an image or image set will not perform well during authentication,
and (ii) that can be transposed to one of the problems identified. For instance, we found that a small KP-CNT
is associated with insufficient light, blur, or trinkets with a plain texture, while a small AvдCrossSim value can
indicate reference images containing non-identical trinkets. Figure 1(c) illustrates the feedback provided when
the user captures a low quality trinket (top) or inconsistent reference images (boom).
To identify such rules, we run Pixie on the Pixie dataset, and investigate reference sets and candidate images
that contributed to misclassified instances as follows. For each pair of the above filter features, we plot the
2D histogram of instances that were correctly classified, and that contributed to false accepts (FA) and false
rejects (FR). Figures 5(a)-(c) illustrates this process for the KP-CNT of template imagesT (R) vs. AvдCrossSim(R)
pair of features. en, we aggregate the results for the three 2D histograms, see Figure 5(d), by calculating the
contribution of each type of classification result (i.e., FA, FR, True Accept (TA) and True Reject (TR)) in a cell of
the 2D histogram. e dark regions have a larger proportion of misclassified than correctly classified instances.
is enables us to identify “problem” regions, where the contribution of misclassified instances (FA and FR) is
larger than that of correctly classified instances (TA and TR). We then define rules, i.e., threshold values, that
avoid clusters of problem regions. For instance, based on the boom area of Figure 5(d), we reject reference sets
whose template has KP-CNT < 20. Similarly, we reject reference sets with AvдCrossSim(R) < 0.6, as we have
none with AvдCrossSim(R) < 0.4 (cells with −1), and those in [0.4, 0.6] are frequently misclassified.
rough a similar process, we have identified several other filtering rules for reference sets and candidate
images, and their real world interpretation, see Table 4 (top 2 sections). RBFilter uses these rules to reject low
quality reference and candidate images, and extend Pixie with informative error messages that guide users to
improve the quality of captured images.
4.4.2 Filter Rule #2: UBounds. We train Pixie on a dataset of images that do not cover the entire value space
of the filter features. Pixie cannot make informed decisions on candidate images whose features take values in
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sub-areas not seen during training. We have identified several such sub-areas for the Pixie dataset. e UBounds
filter consists of the “universe boundary” rules listed in Table 4 (boom section), that define these sub-areas.
5 EVALUATION
We have implemented Pixie using Android 3.2, OpenCV 2.4.10 and Weka [82]. In the following we first evaluate
the performance of the Pixie features, and parameters, under several supervised learning algorithms. We then
evaluate the performance of Pixie’s optimal configuration under the aacks introduced in § 3.3. We report the
performance of Pixie through its False Accept Rate (FAR), False Reject Rate (FRR), Equal Error Rate (EER), the
rate at which FAR = FRR, F-measure, and Failure to Enroll (FTE). For our experiments, we have used a Mac OS
X (2.9 GHz Intel Core i7 CPU, and 8GB DDR3 RAM) and a Nexus 4 smartphone (ad-core 1.5 GHz Krait, and
2GB RAM).
5.1 Data
We have collected and generated the following datasets:
Nexus image dataset. We used a Nexus 4 device to capture 1, 400 photos of 350 unique trinkets, belonging to
33 object categories. We selected only objects that can be easily carried by users and are thus ideal candidates
for image-based trinkets, e.g., watches, shoes, jewelery, shirt paerns, credit cards and logos. We have captured
4 images for each trinket, that differ in background and lighting conditions, i.e., either indoors using artificial
light or outdoors in daylight conditions.
Pixie dataset. To evaluate Pixie, we generate authentication instances that consist of one candidate image and
3 reference images. To prevent “tainting”, we need to ensure that instances used for testing do not contain
reference images that have appeared in a training instance. For this, we use the 1, 400 images of the 350 trinkets,
to generate 10 Pixie subsets, each containing 10 folds, as follows. To generate one of the 10 folds of one of the
10 subsets, we first randomly split the 350 trinkets into 10 sets of 35 trinkets each. For each trinket in a set, we
randomly select one of its 4 images as candidate; the remaining 3 images are reference images. e trinket then
contributes to the fold by one genuine instance (its candidate + its 3 reference images) and 34 “fraud” instances.
Each fraud instance combines the trinket’s candidate image with the 3 reference images of one of the other 34
trinkets in the subset. us, each fold consists of 35 authentic and 1190 = 35 × 34 fraud instances. en, one
of the 10 Pixie subsets contains 12, 250 authentication instances. us, the Pixie dataset has a total of 122, 500
authentication instances.
Google Image dataset. We used Google’s image search site to retrieve at least 200 images from each of the
33 object categories of the Nexus image dataset, for a total of 7, 853 images. is dataset forms the basis of a
shoulder surfing aack (see § 5.3).
ALOI dataset. We use the illumination subset of the Amsterdam Library of Object Images (ALOI) [31] dataset,
that contains 24 different images for 1000 small objects (i.e., natural trinket choices) captured under various
illumination conditions. We cropped these images to the size of the Nexus images (270 × 312 pixels), while
keeping their object centered.
Caltech101 dataset. Caltech101 [27] is a collection of 9, 145 images from 101 object categories.
5.2 Parameter Choice for Pixie
We first identify the parameters where Pixie performs best.
ORB vs. SURF. We compare the performance of Pixie when using two popular keypoint extraction algorithms,
ORB [60] and SURF [3]. We use Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) for the Pixie classifier, and no filter. We perform
the evaluation through 10-fold cross validation on each of the 10 subsets of the Pixie dataset (see § 5.1). Table 5
reports the performance of ORB and SURF: SURF has lower FAR and FRR, leading to an EER that is smaller by
2% than that of ORB.
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Keypoint Detector FAR(%) FRR(%) F-measure(%) EER(%)
ORB 0.10 9.83 93.08 4.87
SURF 0.07 4.80 96.40 2.80
Table 5. ORB vs. SURF based Pixie (MLP classifier, no filter) performance, on the Pixie dataset. SURF has lower FAR and
FRR compared to ORB.
Pixie Classifier FAR(%) FRR(%) F-measure(%) EER(%)
MLP 0.10 9.83 93.08 4.87
RF 0.02 10.74 93.90 3.82
SVM 0.00 12.57 93.04 10.74
Decision Tree (C4.5) 0.17 11.54 91.01 7.66
Table 6. Classifier performance on Pixie dataset using ORB keypoint extractor and no filter. Random Forest and MLP
achieve the lowest EER, thus we only use them in the following.
Images Filtering Rule FAR(%) FRR(%) F-measure(%)
Reference KP-CNT <20 0.09 6.60 95.06
Reference DTC-KP <30 0.10 9.12 93.46
Reference AvgCrossSim <0.6 0.07 8.10 94.53
Reference All 3 Filters 0.06 4.46 96.75
Ref. & cand. All RBFilter Rules 0.04 5.25 96.58
Table 7. Performance of Pixie MLP classifier with RBFilter on the Pixie dataset. The disjunction of all the RBFilters on the
reference images reduced the FAR and FRR by more than 40%.
However, ORB is faster than SURF: In an experiment on 100 Nexus images, ORB took an average 0.15s to
extract keypoints on the Nexus 4, while SURF took 2.5s on the Mac and almost 5s on the Nexus 4. ORB’s
keypoint match is also faster: In an experiment over 10, 000 image pairs, on the Nexus 4, SURF’s keypoint match
took an average of 2.72s, while ORB took 0.66s.
Given the trade-off between speed and accuracy, SURF is more suitable when the image processing and match-
ing tasks can be performed on a server. e faster ORB should be preferred in the mobile authentication scenario,
when these tasks have to be performed by a mobile device. In the following experiments, we set Pixie’s keypoint
extraction algorithm to be ORB.
Classifier Choice. We use the Pixie dataset to identify the best performing classifier for Pixie’s authentication
module. Table 6 shows the results: Random Forest (RF) and MLP outperform Support Vector Machine (SVM) and
Decision Tree (DT) through lower FAR and FRR. In the following, we use only RF and MLP as Pixie’s classifiers.
Pixie with RBFilter. We evaluate the effects of the RBFilter rules of Table 4 on the performance of Pixie. For
this, in each of the 100 classification experiments (10 folds cross validation over each of the 10 subsets of the
Pixie dataset), we remove from the Pixie test fold all the authentication instances that satisfy the rules. We then
run Pixie (with MLP) on this filtered dataset.
Table 7 shows that all the rules are effective: each increases Pixie’s F-measure. e disjunction of all the
reference set filter rules is the most effective, for an F-measure of 96.75% (3.8% improvement from the unfiltered
93.08% of Table 5). e 3 reference set filter rules remove an average of 6.68 reference sets from a testing fold.
When also using the candidate image filter, that removes an average of 82.23 authentication instances per testing
fold, Pixie’s F-measure drops to 96.58%. is is because we count the “valid” instances removed by the candidate
filter as part of FRR, even though they are likely of low quality and can mislead Pixie.
Camera Based Two Factor Authentication Through Mobile and Wearable Devices • 1
Pixie CBFilter FAR(%) FRR(%) F-measure(%) EER(%)
MLP MLP 0.07 6.34 95.54 2.97
MLP RF 0.06 4.70 96.52 1.87
MLP C4.5 0.02 7.19 95.92 2.35
MLP SVM 0.10 9.83 93.08 4.87
RF MLP 0.02 7.64 95.63 2.72
RF RF 0.01 5.74 96.77 1.96
RF C4.5 0.02 7.19 95.92 2.35
RF SVM 0.02 10.74 93.90 3.82
Table 8. Pixie + CBFilter performance, for various combinations of supervised learning algorithms. CBFilter is effective:
when using RF, it reduces the EER of Pixie (with MLP) to 1.87%.
Algo FAR(%) FRR(%) F-measure(%)
Pixie 0.10 9.83 93.08
Pixie & RBFilter 0.04 5.25 96.58
Pixie & CBFilter 0.06 4.70 96.52
Pixie & RBFilter & CBFilter 0.02 4.25 97.52
Table 9. Filters effects on Pixie performance. The combination of RBFilter and CBFilter (RF) has the best performance.
Pixie with CBFilter. To provide a large training set for CBFilter, we first build a Reference Set Bank (RSB),
that contains all the reference sets that appear in the 10 subsets of the Pixie dataset. For each such reference
set, the RSB also stores its “class”, according to the outcome of Pixie: if the reference set has been part of any
authentication instance (in the Pixie dataset) that was incorrectly classified by Pixie (i.e., either as FR or FA), its
class is 1, otherwise it is 0.
We use the RSB set for the following evaluation process, performed separately for each subset of the Pixie
dataset. Each of the subset’s 10 folds, is used once for testing. Given one such fold, e.g., F1, we extract its
reference sets. We train CBFilter on all the reference sets of RSB, that are different from the reference sets of
fold F1, then test CBFilter on the reference sets of F1. We filter from F1 all the reference sets that are labeled as
1 by CBFilter. Finally, we train Pixie on the 9 other folds (F2..F10) and test it on the filtered F1. We repeat this
process 100 times (for the 10 folds of each of the 10 subsets of the Pixie dataset).
Table 8 compares the performance of various classifiers for both Pixie and CBFilter. It shows that CBFilter
is effective: when using Random Forest, it reduces the EER of Pixie to 1.87% (from 4.87%), and removes 3.45
reference sets on average from a testing fold.
Pixie, RBFilter and CBFilter. When used in combination with RBFilter, CBFilter removes an additional 0.9
reference sets on average from a testing fold. RBFilter’s candidate rule also removes 79.59 instances. Table 9
compares the performance of the combined Pixie, RBFilter and CBFilter against the performance of the unfiltered
Pixie, as well as Pixie’s combination with only one of the filters. When used together, the filters reduce the FAR
of the basic Pixie by 80% and its FRR by 56%.
Comparison to other authentication methods. e performance of Pixie (EER=1.87) compares favorably
with the performance of other biometric based authentication solutions. For instance, Meng et al. [49] report
EERs of 2-4% and 2-6% for authentication solutions based on face and fingerprint. Samangouei et al. [62] report
EERs of 13-30% for aribute based face authentication, and Taigman et al. [75] report an EER of 8.6% for face
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Aack Dataset FAR(%)
Google 0.054
ALOI 0.087
Caltech101 0.042
Table 10. Performance of Pixie (with RBFilter and CBFilter) on the ALOI, Caltech101 and Google aack datasets: Onmore
than 14M attack authentication samples, the FRR of Pixie is less than 0.09%.
recognition using features extracted by deep neural networks. e gaze-challenge authentication solution of
Sluganovic et al. [72] has an EER of 6.3%, while Zhao et al. [88] report EERs between 4.1-9.6% for touch gesture
based authentication.
5.3 Pixie Under Aack
We investigate the performance of Pixie, trained on one of the 10 Pixie subsets, under the aacks of § 3.3. We
use the previously identified parameters: the ORB keypoint extractor, MLP for the Pixie classifier, RF for the
CBFilter classifier, and all the rules for RBFilter. Using UBounds filter we obtain a conservative performance of
Pixie: with UBounds, Pixie would easily reject out of bounds images, artificially boosting its accuracy.
Attack datasets. We use the Nexus dataset (§ 5.1) to build 3 authentication aack datasets based on the ALOI,
Google Image and Caltech101 sets. We use the Google Image based aack dataset for a shoulder surfing aack,
and, along with the ALOI and Caltech101 datasets, to evaluate brute force pictionary aacks.
We generate the authentication aack instances for each aack dataset, and group them into 10 folds, as
follows. We randomly split the 350 unique trinkets of the Nexus dataset into 10 subsets of 35 trinkets each. For
each trinket in a subset, we randomly select 3 out of its 4 images, to form a reference set. We then combine
this set with each of the images from ALOI, Google Image, and Caltech101 datasets, respectively. We repeat this
process for all the 35 reference sets in a fold. us, in the ALOI aack dataset, a fold contains 840K = 35 × 24K
aack instances, for a total of 8.4M ALOI based aack instances. Similarly, the Google Image aack dataset
contains 2.7M+ aack instances, while the Caltech101 aack dataset contains 3.2M+ instances.
5.3.1 Pictionary Aack. Under the Google Image aack dataset, Pixie achieved a FAR of 0.054%, see Table 10.
216 of the 350 trinkets were unbreakable. However, we counted each such trinket as success at 7, 853 trials. en,
the average number of Google dataset based “trials until success”, over the 350 trinkets is 5, 766.12. For the ALOI
based aack, when using both RBFilter and CBFilter, Pixie achieved a FAR of 0.087%. Under the Caltech101
aack, Pixie’s FAR is 0.042%. e higher FAR of the ALOI pictionary aack dataset may be due to the similarity
of its images of small objects to images in the Pixie datase. Pixie filters about 10 reference sets from each aack
dataset. In addition, it filters a small number of candidate images (82 and 5) from the Google and Caltech101
datasets, but 1,449 candidate images from the ALOI dataset.
5.3.2 Restricted Shoulder Surfing Aack. We use the Pixie and Google Image datasets to evaluate the “guess-
ing entropy” [19] of the restricted shoulder surfing aack. e aack proceeds as follows: For each reference set
of a Pixie dataset trinket, we re-order the Google dataset images to start the brute force aack with images of
the same type as the trinket. We then use as candidate, each image in the re-ordered Google dataset, and count
the number of trials before a match (false accept) occurs. us, this experiment evaluates the scenario where
the adversary exploits his knowledge of the trinket type.
As in the pictionary aack above, we counted each of the 216 unbreakable trinkets as “success” at 7, 853 (the
size of the aack dataset) trials. en, the average number of “trials until success”, over the 350 Pixie dataset
trinkets was 5, 639.53. is result is similar to the above pictionary aack: In fact, an unpaired t-test did not find
a statistically significant difference in the number of trials to break a reference set between the two scenarios
Camera Based Two Factor Authentication Through Mobile and Wearable Devices • 1
Fig. 6. Example master images for Pixie: each of these images matches multiple reference sets of the Pixie dataset. Master
images tend to have a rich combination of shapes, shadows, colors and leers.
(p − value = 0.44, for α = 0.05). us, in our experiments, knowledge of the trinket type does not provide the
adversary with a significant guessing advantage.
5.3.3 The Master Image Aack and Defense. We identified 788 master images in the ALOI dataset, 75 in the
Caltech Image dataset, and 127 in the Google dataset. Master images match multiple Pixie reference sets. Upon
manual inspection, we observed that master images are not of the same type of trinket as the reference set that
they match. Instead, they contain an array of shapes, shadows, leers and colors, that translate into a diverse
sets of keypoints, see Figure 6 for examples. Less than half of the master images in the ALOI (224), Caltech101
(34) and Google (30) datasets match at least 5 reference sets. 1 master image in the Caltech101 dataset matches
51 reference sets.
Defense. e shape formed by the matched keypoints in a master image is likely to be inconsistent with that
of the “victim” reference set. We leverage this observation to introduce several new features: the distance to
the centroid of the matched keypoints (DTC-MKP) in the candidate and template images, and the min, max and
mean of the DTC-MKP over all pairs of candidate and reference images. We train the Pixie classifier using this
enhanced feature set, and test it on the ALOI aack dataset. e enhanced Pixie reduces the number of effective
ALOI master images (matching at least 5 reference sets) by 60%, i.e., from 224 to 88.
To evaluate the effect of the new features on the FRR, we run Pixie with both RBFilters and CBFilters on the
10 Pixie data subsets (see § 5.1) in a 10-fold cross validation experiment similar to that of § 5.2. We observed that
when new features are included in the classification task, the FRR of Pixie decreases slightly from 4.25% (last
row in Table 9) to 4.01%, while its FAR remained unchanged (0.02%). We conclude that the newly added features
do not increase Pixie’s FRR.
6 USER STUDY
We have used a lab study to evaluate the usability of Pixie’s trinket based authentication and compared it against
text-based passwords. In this section, we describe the methodology and results.
6.1 Design and Procedure
We performed a within-subjects study, where all the participants were exposed to every conditions considered.
Specifically, the conditions were to authenticate from a smartphone to the Florida International University Portal
Website (MyFIU), using (i) their username and text-based password and (ii) their Pixie trinket. MyFIU is a site
that provides students with information about class schedules and administrative functionality.
We have recruited participants from the university campus over e-mail lists, bulletin boards and personal
communications. All the participants were students enrolled at the university. e reason for selecting students
for the study was to ensure a consistent and familiar login procedure to remote services. e participants in our
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Demographic Number Proportion (%)
Gender
Female 11 26
Male 31 74
Age
Min 18
Max 50
Median 28
Android 20 48
iPhone 21 50
Windows phone 1 2
Undergraduate 16 38
Graduate 26 62
CS/IT 38 90
Other majors 4 10
Use phone to login to remote services? 41 98
Table 11. Participant demographics. We chose only students in order to have a consistent experience for remote authenti-
cation (on the university portal website, MyFIU).
Fig. 7. The level of agreement of the participants with ease of remembering faces, photos and text. 42% of the participants
strongly agree to their ease of remembering photos and faces vs. only 16% who agreed it is easy for them to remember text.
study achieved text password authentication times on par with previously reported results (see § 6.2.4). Consid-
ering the ubiquity of mobile devices, we believe that the participants had no unfair advantage when compared to
other social groups of similar age, with respect to their ability to perform the basic action of snapping a picture
with a smartphone.
In the following, we first presents some demographic information about the (n=42) participants in this study,
then describe the procedure we used to perform the user study.
Demographics. We have recruited 42 participants for our lab study. Table 11 shows the demographics of the
participants, obtained through the study questionnaires. In addition, 41 (98%) participants said they use their
phones to login to their online accounts.
We also asked the participants to express their level of agreement using a 5-point Likert scale (from 1-strongly
disagree to 5-strongly agree) with how easy it is for them to remember text, photos and faces. Figure 7 shows
the summary of the participants responses. More than 42% of the participants strongly agreed that it is easy
for them to remember faces and photos. However, only 16% of the participants strongly agreed it is easy for
them to remember text. While 64.29% of the participants said it is not easy for them to remember text, a lower
47.62% and 42.86% of the participants said it is not easy for them to remember photos and faces respectively. A
pairwise non-parametricWilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test revealed no significant difference between the perceived
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Fig. 8. Pixie in-app instructions (best viewed in color) showing how to (a) setup a trinket, (b) confirm the trinket, (c) enter
credentials for the MyFIU account the first time the app is used, and (d) login using the trinket.
memorability for different items. Based on this analysis and given the picture superiority effect [51], we posit
that memorizing trinkets and their secret angles could be perceived to be as memorable as faces and text. We
compare the perceived memorability of trinkets and text passwords in § 6.2.3.
e study procedure. We have conducted the study in an indoor lab using the existing artificial lighting. For
the authentication device, we have used an HTC One M7 smartphone (1.7GHz CPU, 2.1 MP camera with f/2.0
aperture, 4.7 inch display with 1920 × 1080 resolution, and 137.4 × 68.2 × 9.33mm overall size).
e study consisted of 3 sessions, taking place on day 1, day 3 and day 8 of the experiment. From the total of
42 participants, 31 participants returned for and completed session 2 (7 female). Due to scheduling constraints, 3
participants returned for session 2 on day 4 or 5. 21 participants returned for and completed session 3 (4 female).
e lab sessions proceeded as follows.
In the first session, we briefed participants about the purpose of the study: To explore the usability and the
user interface design of a mobile device application. en we asked them to use Pixie to login to their MyFIU
account, using their credentials (username and password). Pixie associates the text credentials with the trinket’s
reference images. During subsequent login sessions, the users only needed to correctly capture the image of their
trinket in order to access their account. Our goal was to let the participants experience Pixie for authentication,
thus we did not ask them to enter their text password in subsequent sessions. As a result, the comparison of
Pixie with text passwords is based only on the data collected in session 1.
Subsequently, the first session consisted of 3 steps. In the discoverability step, we gave no verbal instructions
to participants. Instead, we asked each participant to try to figure out how to use Pixie, given only the in-app
instructions, that show a watch as a trinket example. Figure 8(a-d) shows snapshots of Pixie app instructions for
seing up a trinket, verifying the trinket, seing up the MyFIU account when the app is used for the first time
and login using trinket.
In the training step, we explained Pixie’s purpose and walked the participant through the process of seing
and testing a trinket using a gum pack. However, we neither justified why we chose this trinket, nor specified
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what other objects can be used as trinkets. We then asked the participants to set a trinket for the rest of the
study.
In the third, repeatability step we asked the participant to repeat the login part of the process. To avoid input
based on muscle memory, we distracted the participant’s aention between the second and third step by playing
a game for 5 minutes.
In session 2 and 3, the participants were asked to login to their MyFIU account with the trinket they chose in
session 1. At the end of each session, the participants filled out questionnaires that use Likert scales (ranging
from 1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree). e questionnaires evaluate Pixie and compare it against text-
based passwords on perceived security, ease of use, memorability and speed dimensions.
In addition, at the end of session 3, we have used “emocards” [23] to evaluate the emotional responses of
users toward Pixie and text password authentication. Emocards are 16 cartoon faces, each representing one
of 8 distinct recognizable facial expression (1 per gender). Emocards assist users to non-verbally express their
emotions about products, in terms of pleasantness (pleasant, neutral, unpleasant) and arousal (calm, average,
excited), two commonly accepted dimensions of emotion responses [61].
Participant dropout. e participant drop from session 1 to session 3 is not due to a dislike of Pixie. To
conclude this, we have compared the distributions of the answers of the 21 participants who dropped and of the
21 participants who stayed until session 3, on their overall impression of Pixie and their willingness to adopt
it. Both questions were rated on a Likert scale. e Mann-Whitney test shows that the difference between the
two populations is not statistically significant (p = 0.7532 for the first question, and p = 0.0701 for the second
question at α = 0.05). e participant drop can be due to the difficulty of scheduling 3 sessions across 8 days, at
the end of the semester.
Ethical considerations. We have worked with our university Institutional Review Board to ensure an ethical
interaction with the participants during the user study. We have asked the participants to avoid choosing sensi-
tive trinkets. e entire experiments took around 40 minutes per participant. We compensated each participant
with a $5 gi card.
6.2 Results
Pixie is a novel authentication solution. us, we first present insights from its use across the 3 sessions, with
a focus on discoverability. We then detail Pixie’s observed memorability and performance, as well as the partic-
ipant perception and emotional responses. All the statistical tests performed in this section used a significance
level of α = 0.05.
6.2.1 User Experience. We now detail the user experience across the 3 sessions.
Session 1: discoverability. Without previous knowledge of Pixie, 86% of the participants (36) were able to
correctly set up their trinkets. erefore, Pixie’s Failure to Enroll (FTE) rate is 14%. From the 14% (6) participants
who failed to enroll, 3 did not notice that the 3 trinket photos had to be of the same object, captured from similar
angles. While Pixie provides a tooltip on the trinket capture buon that guides the user to take another picture
of the trinket when the app is used for the first time (see Figure 1(a)), these 3 participants took random pictures
from different objects in the lab. ese participants also did not understand the meaning of several words, as
English was their second language:
[P20]: “Include one page saying what the trinket is. Like [sic], you can say that trinket is an object
that you will be using to sign in to your account”.
[P21]: “I don’t understand what plain texture means”.
In all 3 cases, the Pixie prefilters identified the issue correctly. e other 3 unsuccessful participants chose
trinkets with a plain texture (e.g., palm of hand, pencil, objects with plain black surface) that generated errors.
ey either dismissed error messages quickly or were not sure what to choose as a trinket to eliminate the errors.
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Subsequently, 3 other participants were unable to perform the trinket verification step within 3 trials. is
occurred due to (i) bad lighting conditions around the trinket, (ii) the participant forgeing the trinket angle, or
(iii) a texture-less (plain) trinket. While the Chi-square test did not identify significant differences in the error
rates caused by any of the aforementioned circumstances (p > 0.05), this could be because of the limited number
of samples.
Session 1: Training. All the participants were able to set up a trinket successfully, reducing the FTE rate of
Pixie from 14% in the discoverability step to 0%. All the participants then tested their trinkets within 4 trials (M
= 1.29 trials, Std = 0.6): 76% of the participants were able to login from the first trial. e other 24% had lighting
related difficulties (e.g., the trinket reflected the light, or was in the shadow). Only one participant required 4
trials.
Session 1: Repeatability. All the participants except one, were able to successfully complete this step within
3 trails (M = 1.29trials, Std = 0.6). One participant required 4 trials.
Sessions 2 and 3. In session 2, 84% of the participants were able to login from the first trial, 13% logged in
within 2-3 trials and only one participant needed 6 trials (M = 1.35 trials, Std = 1.02). 2 participants did not carry
their trinkets and had to reset them. In session 3, 81% of the participants were able to login from the first trial
and all the other participants were able to login within 2-3 trials (M = 1.20 trials, Std = 0.40).
6.2.2 Participant Performance. To measure participant performance we use success rate [14], defined as the
number of successful aempts to the total number of aempts. In order to compare the success rate of partici-
pants for text-based passwords and Pixie, we analyzed the data from either of the login recalls of each session.
We only consider successful Pixie authentication sessions within 3 trials (see § 6.2.1). is is similar to My-
FIU, where the participants need to reset their passwords aer 3 unsuccessful trials. e success rate of Pixie
improves from session 1 (82.00%) to session 2 (83.33%) and session 3 (84.00%). roughout all the 3 sessions,
the Pixie success rate for successful authentication sessions is slightly lower than the success rate for the text-
based password in session 1 (88.10%). is is not surprising, given the significantly lower number of practice
opportunities for Pixie, compared to the ubiquitous text passwords. However, the Chi-square test revealed no
significant difference between the success rate for Pixie and text password in session 1 (χ2(1) = 0.506,p = 0.48).
Similarly, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test found no significant difference in terms of the number of aempts
for a successful login for Pixie within different sessions, and between Pixie and text-based password in session
1.
6.2.3 Memorability. During session 2, 96% of the participants (all except one) were able to remember their
trinkets. 2 participants did not immediately recall the part of the trinket they used to authenticate, but they
figured it out in the 3rd aempt. ese 2 participants were able to login in the first aempt in the 3rd session.
During session 3, all the participants were able to remember their trinkets. We contrast these results with the
memorability of text passwords: 5 participants did not remember their MyFIU password and had to reset it in
the first session. is is consistent with previous findings: Wiedenbeck et al. [85]) report that more than 17% of
text-based passwords are forgoen in one week.
6.2.4 User Entry Time. We have measured the user entry time, the interval from the moment when a user
starts Pixie and when Pixie submits the captured photo to the authentication module. Figure 9 shows the box
plot of the user entry time for Pixie in different sessions vs. the time for text passwords, during session 1.
e shortest authentication session was 3.01s and the longest session was 70.51s for Pixie. e average entry
time improves from session 1 (M=9.71s, Std=11.42s, Mdn=6.24s), to session 2 (M=9.71s, Std=4.66s, Mdn=8.32s)
and session 3 (M=7.99s, Std=2.26s, Mdn=8.51s). However, Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests did not reveal any
statistically significant differences between the Pixie user entry time across the 3 sessions. We expect however
that additional practice can further improve Pixie’s entry time.
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Fig. 9. Box plot for entry time of Pixie across 3 sessions vs. text password in session 1. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
revealed that Pixie’s entry time in each session was significantly less than the entry time for text passwords. For
a single participant, the Pixie entry time was 70.51s during session 1.
Moreover, a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test revealed that the entry time for Pixie was significantly less than
the entry time for text passwords in session 1 (W = 845.0,p = 0.000). We emphasize that in contrast to text
passwords, Pixie participants did not have the opportunity to practice beyond the steps of the above procedure.
Table 1 compares the entry time for Pixie and other authentication solutions based on biometrics or text and
graphical passwords. Although Pixie’s entry time is higher compared to solutions based on face or voice, it
compares well to several other solutions. For instance, Shay et al. [70] report an entry time of 11.6-16.2 for text
passwords. MyFIU passwords are similar to the comp8 category in [70] (at least 8 characters, and include a
lowercase English leer, uppercase English leer, and digit) for which [70] report a median entry time of 13.2s.
e additional safeguards of Boehm et al.’s [8] face and eyes based biometric solution result in an entry time of
20-40s. Chiasson et al. [14] report an entry time of about 15s for Passpoints. Trewin et al. [76] reported an entry
time of 8.1s for gesture (stroke) based biometric. e eye tracking solution of Liu et al. [44] requires 9.6s and the
audio or haptic based solution of Bianchi et al. [6] requires 10.8 − 20.1s.
In addition, we evaluated the processing overhead of Pixie: the time required to decide if a candidate image
matches the reference set. e average processing overhead of Pixie on the HTC One smartphone over 94
successful authentication trials is 0.5 seconds.
6.2.5 Perception. We asked the participants to express their perception about Pixie and text passwords by
providing answers to a set of questions in a 5-point Likert scale (from strongly agree to strongly disagree). In
the following we presents the participants response.
At the end of session 1, 81% of the participants said overall, Pixie is easier to use than text-based passwords
(Figure 10(a) (top)). 83% and 86% of the participants agree or strongly agree that the trinket setup and login steps
are easy (Figure 10(a) (boom)). 95% of participants agree or strongly agree that overall, Pixie is easy to use.
Furthermore, 86% of the participants agree or strongly agree that trinkets are easy to remember, see Fig-
ure 10(b) (top). 67% of the participants agree that trinkets are easier to remember than passwords, while only 5%
of the participants believe the opposite, see Figure 10(a) (top) and Figure 10(b) (boom). ese results improve
in sessions 2 and 3. At the end of session 3, all the participants agree that trinkets are easy to remember (Fig-
ure 10(b) (top)): 12 participants changed their opinion in favor of Pixie’s memorability. No participants believe
that text passwords are easier to remember than trinkets, see Figure 10(b) (boom). A two-sample proportion
test revealed that the proportion of the participants who think Pixie is memorable, significantly increases from
session 1 to session 2 and 3 (Z = 2.36, p = 0.009 and Z = 2.05, p = 0.020).
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Fig. 10. (a) Results at the end of session 1. (a - top) Perceived performance of Pixie compared to text passwords. Pixie
dominates on ease of use, memorability and speed dimensions. (b - boom) Pixie ease of use: 95% of participants agreed that
Pixie is easy to use. (b - top) Pixie perceived memorability. 86% of participants agree that the trinkets are easy to remember
aer session 1, but reach consensus aer session 3. (b - boom) Perceived memorability of Pixie vs. text passwords (TP). No
participant believes text passwords are more memorable aer session 3.
36% of the participants believe that Pixie is more secure than text passwords, and 31% of the participants
believe that passwords are more secure (Figure 10(a) (le)). Several participants felt strongly about the security
of Pixie, e.g.,:
[P27] “is method is even more secure than text-based passwords, because even if someone sees me
during the password entry, he wouldn’t know what part of the object I have selected as my trinket and
cannot easily figure it out”.
68% of participants agree or strongly agree that the trinket based login is fast. 74% of participants agree or
strongly agree that the trinket setup step is fast. 95% and 59% of the participants agree that Pixie’s login and
trinket setup steps are faster compared to the corresponding text password operations. (Figure 10(a) (top)). 50%
of the participants say that they prefer trinkets over text passwords (Figure 10(a) (top, boom bar)).
When asked if they would use trinket based authentication in real life 26% of participants said that they would
use Pixie for most of their accounts, 36% would use it for at least some of their accounts, and 36%would consider
using it. Only 2% of the participants (1) said that they would not use it. Several participants felt strongly about
adopting Pixie:
[P18]: “Why isn’t [Pixie] integrated with the original MyFIU mobile application as another option for
signing to my account?”.
[P40]: “I always forget my passwords […] I always store them in my browser. I would definitely use
Pixie if it is available”.
Statistical analysis. To differentiate true choice from random chance, we combine the strongly agree and agree
answers into an “agreement” answer, and the strongly disagree and disagree answers into a “disagreement” an-
swer. We then use a one-sample binomial test with a confidence interval in order to test whether the proportion
of agreement of the participants with a statement is sufficiently different from a random choice (50%). Table 12
presents this result for the proportion of “agreement” answers to each question. Pixie is perceived easier, more
memorable and faster than text passwords for login and the perceived advantage is not due to random choice.
However, the participant do not perceive a significant difference in setup speed, and security of Pixie over text
passwords.
Analysis of User Feedback. Table 13 shows that the general preference of Pixie over text passwords signifi-
cantly correlates positively with its preference on ease of use, memorability and security and speed dimensions.
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estion Sample proportion 95% CI p
Easier to use 80.95 (65.88, 91.39) 0.000*
More memorable 66.67 (50.45, 80.43) 0.044*
Faster Login 95.24 (83.83, 99.41) 0.000*
Faster Setup 58.54 (40.96, 72.27) 0.441
More secure 35.71 (21.55, 51.97) 0.088
* Statistically significant result at α = 0.05.
Table 12. Confidence interval for the proportion of “agreement” answers to usability and security questions comparing
Pixie and text-based authentication. Pixie is perceived to be easier to use, more memorable and faster than text passwords.
Pixie’s perceived advantage in ease of use, memorability, and login speed is not due to random choice.
Prefer Pixie over text passwords τb p
Easier to use 0.60 0.000*
More memorable 0.54 0.000*
More secure 0.38 0.003*
Faster Setup 0.46 0.000*
Faster Login 0.48 0.000*
Pixie Memorability 0.40 0.003*
Willingness to Use Pixie 0.60 0.000*
* Indicates a statistically significant correlation at α = 0.05.
Table 13. Kendall’s Tau-b test shows significant positive correlation between preference of Pixie vs. text passwords, and its
preference in terms of ease of use, memorability, security, faster setup and login time. Preference over text passwords is also
significantly correlated with the overall memorability of the trinket and willingness to adopt Pixie.
e preference over text passwords is also significantly correlated with overall perception of trinket memorabil-
ity and willingness to adopt Pixie. Interestingly, we observed a significant correlation between preference over
text passwords on security and the participant feeling of owning a unique trinket (τ = 0.36,p = 0.005).
e participant willingness to use Pixie also correlates positively with perceived memorability (τb = 0.29),
perceived ease of use (τb = 0.28), general preference over text passwords (τb = 0.32), preference over text
passwords on security (τb = 0.28), and preference on ease of use (τb = 0.04). We observe a negative correlation
between the willingness to use Pixie and the number of login aempts (τb = −0.16), highlighting the impact of
unsuccessful logins. However, the correlations are not statistically significant.
6.2.6 Emotional Response. e emocard experiment revealed that Pixie generates only positive emotions:
81% of the participants reported a “pleasant”, and 19% reported a “neutral” experience. In addition, 47% of
the participants were “calm”, 34% were “average” and 19% were “excited”. In contrast to Pixie, only 5% of the
participants (1) reported a “pleasant” level for text passwords, while 57% reported “unpleasant” and 38% reported
“neutral” levels. A one-sided test of the difference of proportions revealed that the proportion of the participants
who perceived Pixie as pleasant was significantly larger than the proportion of the participants who perceived
text passwords as pleasant (Z = 4.01, p = 0.000).
e Kendall’s Tau-b correlations ploed in Figure 11 shows that the participant reports of willingness to use
Pixie correlate positively with levels of pleasure and excitement, as well as Pixie’s perceived ease of use. While
4 participants reported excitement for Pixie’s novelty, functionality and performance, we observe no correlation
between “excited” levels and willingness to use. is is a positive finding, as authentication solutions should not
generate high arousal levels.
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Fig. 11. Kendall’s Tau-b correlations between willingness to use, emotional responses (pleasure and excitement), and ease
of use (SA/SD = Strongly Agree/Disagree), during session 3. No participant rated Pixie as unpleasant. Willingness to use
correlates positively with pleasant and average levels, as well as with agreement with ease of use.
Object type # of unique objects # of participants # of unique trinkets
Gum pack 3 16 8
Watch 6 6 6
Mug 3 3 3
Logo 2 2 2
Keychain 2 2 2
Car remote control key 2 2 2
Sunglasses 2 2 2
A piece of puzzle 1 1 1
Shoe 1 1 1
Kohl container 1 1 1
Backpack pin 1 1 1
Hair clip 1 1 1
Cigaree box 1 1 1
Match box 1 1 1
Water Bole 1 1 1
iphone menu 1 1 1
University ID card 1 1 1
Taoo 1 1 1
Total 31 44 36
Table 14. Trinket choice: object types chosen by participants, along with the number of unique objects belonging to each
category and number of unique trinket choice (object + angle) in the study. The gum pack and watch (used in the training
step and on-screen instructions) are the types most frequently used by the participants. All the captured watch trinkets are
unique.
6.2.7 Trinket Choice. We manually analyzed the trinket images captured by the participants in the first ses-
sion (42 trinkets) and those captured by the participants who reset their trinket in session 2 (2 trinkets). We
allowed the participants to pick any nearby object as a trinket. e 42 participants picked a total of 36 unique
trinkets, from 31 unique objects of 18 types, chosen from among participant owned objects and lab objects. e
gum pack and watch were the most frequently chosen object types. However, all the 6 watch trinkets were
different, and the 16 participants who chose a gum pack have captured 8 unique trinket images (object + angle
combination).
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In the discoverability step, 8 participants used their watches as trinkets. We did not observe a significant
difference in user choice of trinket between the discoverability and training steps: 18 participants used the same
trinket in the discoverability and training steps. 8 participant chose their trinket to be their watches. e other
trinket categories chose by participants that are not among those in Table 14 include: pen/pencil, book and
computer mouse.
We have used the images captured by the participants to “brute force” the reference sets of each participant.
We removed 8 reference sets as they were identical (the top view of the same gum pack). is has produced
a single “success” event, for the two participants who chose the same side of the same gum pack, with very
similar angles. As we described in § 6.2.5, the participant preference of Pixie over text passwords on security
correlates significantly with the participant feeling of owning a unique trinket. We did not observe a statistically
significant difference between the feeling of owning a unique trinket and participants gender.
7 DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
Authentication speed. Our user study shows that Pixie’s authentication speed in session 1 is 25% faster than
well rehearsed text passwords and improves through even mild repetition. However, Pixie’s entry time is longer
than the reported entry time for face based authentication solutions (see Table 1). is may be due to either
the novelty of Pixie or the way the images are captured, i.e. using the back, not the front camera for capturing
trinket images.
Secure image storage and processing. e storage and processing of the trinket images needs to be performed
securely. While outside the focus of this paper, we briefly discuss and compare trinket image storage and pro-
cessing solutions that are performed on the remote service vs. the user’s authentication device. A remote server
based solution trivially protects against an adversary that captures the authentication device, as the device does
not store or process sensitive user information. e image matching process is also faster on a server than on
a mobile device (see § 5.2). e drawbacks are the overhead of transmiing candidate images over the cellular
network, and the imposition on users to register a different reference image set for each remote service.
e authentication device based solution can easily associate the reference images with the user’s authenti-
cation credentials (e.g. OAuth [18]) for multiple remote services. However, since an aacker can capture and
thus access the storage of the mobile device, reference images cannot be stored or processed in cleartext. e
storage and processing of reference images can however be secured through hardware-level protection, e.g.,
TrustZone [77], or by using privacy preserving image feature extraction solutions that work in the encrypted
domain, e.g., [36, 57, 81].
Deployability. Pixie is well suited for OAuth [18] authorization to access remote services from the mobile
device: Pixie authenticates the user to the app on the mobile device, which can then proceed with the OAuth
protocol with the remote server.
Default authentication. If the trinket based authentication fails a number of times (due to e.g., forgoen trinket,
poor lighting conditions, unsteady hand), the user is prompted to use the default authentication solution, e.g.,
text password.
Strong passwords. Popular and ubiquitously available trinkets (e.g., iWatch, Coke can) should not be chosen
as trinkets, as an adversary can easily predict and replicate them. To address this problem, Pixie can store a
dataset of popular trinket images, then, during the trinket setup process, reject reference sets that match popular
trinkets.
Defense against brute force attacks. e brute force aacks of § 3.3 can be made harder to launch through
video “liveness” verifications, e.g., [58]: capture both video and accelerometer streams while the user shoots the
trinket, then use video liveness checks to verify the consistency between the movements extracted from the two
streams. e lack of such streams or their inconsistency can indicate a brute force aack.
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e user study. e study presented in this work was the first aempt to quantify the usability aspects of
an authentication solution based on trinkets. We performed the user study in a lab seing. We were able
to recruit only 42 participants, of which half did not stay until the last session. As we wanted to ensure a
consistent and familiar login procedure to remote services for the participants, we only recruited students from
the university who had access to myFIU, FIU’s login portal. While the population of the study is not fully
representative of the users who would use the system, we believe that the participants had no unfair advantage
when compared to other social groups of similar age in performance: the participants in our study achieved text
password authentication times on par with previously reported results (see § 6.2.4).
Pixie works by extracting invariant keypoints from the captured images, using keypoint extraction algorithms
(e.g. SURF [3] and ORB [60]). ese algorithms are not capable of extracting keypoints from images of object
with constant shade. We aempted to address this issue by providing actionable feedback to users, and guiding
them toward choosing visually complex trinkets. In addition, to ensure Pixie is able to identify the trinket images
even when captured in slightly different circumstances and to lower the false reject rate, we required the users
to enter 3 trinket images in the registration phase. is may partially explain why the participants in our study
did not perceive Pixie as significantly faster than text passwords for the registration phase.
During the discoverability step, we observed that several participants had difficulties in understanding the
in-app instructions on how to use Pixie. Similar problems have been reported for other authentication mecha-
nisms. For instance, Bhagavatula et al. [4] reported that 7 out of 10 participants found understanding on-screen
instructions difficult for iPhone fingerprint authentication. ey recommend to provide clearer instructions (e.g.
through a demo video) on what the users need to do. We posit that explaining the meaning of trinkets will help
users during the registration phase and improve the discoverability rate of Pixie.
In addition, we observed that similar to face based authentication, Pixie has problems with insufficient light-
ing. A comprehensive study similar to the studies conducted for biometric based solutions (e.g. [4]) may help
identify other potential limitations of Pixie in different situations (e.g. authentication while walking, in public
transportation, etc).
e consent form that we read and the participants signed prior to the study, emphasizes that the focus
of the study is on the usability aspects of a new authentication mechanism. We observed that some of the
participants might have selected trinkets without concerns over security during the study. We did not guide the
participants towards choosing specific trinkets, as we intended to observe the personal or lab objects chosen
by the participants. Nevertheless, we observed that the participants preference of Pixie over text passwords on
security correlates significantly with the participants feeling of owning a unique trinket. is suggests that the
participants could corroborate the relationship between unique trinkets and higher level of security.
e trinkets used to walk the participants through Pixie (i.e., gum pack) and the in-app user guide of Pixie
(i.e., watch), appear to influence the participant trinket selection in the first session: In the discoverability step, 8
participant chose their watches as trinkets. In addition, during session 1, 9 participants chose the same gum pack
as used in the Pixie walk-through without even trying a different angle, and 5 participants used their watches as
trinkets. Further studies are required to understand whether other means of communicating the goals of Pixie
(e.g. using a short video that guides the user on how to choose secure and unique trinkets) can reduce this bias.
Further, although 50% of the participants said they prefer Pixie over text passwords, 40% percent of the par-
ticipants were undecided. is may be due to the limited experience of the participants with Pixie. In addition,
62% participants said they would use Pixie in real life. We did not observe a statistically significant correlation
between being excited about using Pixie, that could be due to the novelty of the method, and willingness to use
it. However, future studies are required to understand in what scenarios and situations the users are willing to
adopt trinket based authentication or prefer it over text passwords. If we were to redo the study, we would split
the Likert scale questions comparing Pixie with text passwords into 2 questions asking the participants to rate
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any of them in terms of usability and security. In addition, we would ask the participants to justify their answers
about perceived usability and security in the form of open ended questions in the post study interview.
Field study. We leave for future work a field study of Pixie to investigate the longer term effects of using
trinket passwords on user entry times, accuracy and memorability, the factors that impact trinket choice, how
users choose and change their trinkets in real life, as well as the potential improvements provided by alternative
means of communication of Pixie’s goals and functionality (e.g., through short video instead of text). We also
leave for future work the investigation of using mental stories to associate trinkets to accounts (e.g., use credit
card as trinket for bank account) and reducing the impact of interference [1, 14].
8 CONCLUSIONS
We introduced Pixie, a proof of concept implementation of a trinket based two-factor authentication approach
that uses invariant keypoints extracted from images to perform the matching between the candidate and ref-
erence images. Pixie only requires a camera, thus applies even to simple, traditional mobile devices as well as
resource limited wearable devices such as smartwatch and smartglasses.
We manually captured and collected from public datasets, 40,000 trinket images. We proposed several aacks
against Pixie and have shown that Pixie achieved an EER of 1.87% and FAR of 0.02% on 122, 500 authentication
aempts and an FAR of less than 0.09% on 14.3 million aack instances generated from the 40,000 images.
We performed an in lab user study to evaluate the usability aspects of Pixie as a novel authentication solution.
Our experiments show that Pixie is discoverable: without external help and prior training, 86% and 78% of the
participants were able to correctly set a trinket then authenticate with it, respectively. 62% of the participants
expressed that they would use Pixie in real life. Pixie simplifies the authentication process: e study shows
that trinkets are not only perceived as more memorable than text passwords, but are also easily remembered 3
and 8 days aer being set, without any inter-session use. In addition, Pixie’s authentication speed in session 1 is
25% faster than well rehearsed text passwords and improves through even mild repetition. We believe that Pixie
can complement existing authentication solutions by providing a fast alternative that does not expose sensitive
user information.
A promising approach to improve Pixie is to use more advanced image processing techniques, e.g. deep neural
networks [74], for image feature extraction and processing. Such techniques may improve Pixie’s usability by
(i) eliminating the requirement for capturing multiple reference images of the trinket in the registration phase,
(ii) increasing the ability to extract features even from images of objects with constant shade, and (iii) further
reducing FRRs.
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